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Abstract: Some retail payment systems can be modelled as two-sided markets, where a 
payment system facilitates money exchanges between consumers on one side and 
merchants on the other. The system sets rules and standards, to ensure usage and 
acceptance of its payment instruments by consumers and merchants respectively.  
Some retail payment systems exhibit indirect network externalities, which is one of the 
main criteria used to define two-sided markets. As more consumers use the payment 
platform, more merchants are encouraged to join it. Conversely, the value of holding 
payment instruments increases with the number of merchants accepting them. The theory 
of two-sided markets contributes to a better understanding of these retail payment 
systems, by showing that an asymmetric allocation of costs is needed to maximise the 
volume of transactions. It also starts to offer results that could explain competition 
between payment platforms. 
However, this theory entails some limits to a thorough understanding of retail payment 
systems. Firstly, we show that some retail payment systems, such as credit transfer or 
direct debit systems, do not necessarily fulfil all the theoretical criteria used to define two-
sided markets. Moreover, this theory does not take into account specific features of the 
payment industry, such as risk management or fraud prevention. This leads us to propose 
new research directions. 
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n December 4th 2004 a failure in the Belgium payment card system 
paralysed merchants' card transactions for over two hours. 
According to the local newspaper Le Soir, retailers sustained losses 
of an estimated EUR 20 million 1. The consequences of this failure show the 
economic importance of payment systems for commercial exchanges. Over 
231 billion transactions worth EUR 52,000 billion are processed each year in 
European payment systems, totalling between 2-3% of European GDP 2. 
                     
(*) I wish to thank "le Groupement des cartes bancaires" CB for its helpful support. 
1 Source : www.silicon.fr, Thursday, December 9th 2004. 
2 Study conducted by McKinsey in 2005, cited by the European Commission in its directive 
proposal for payment services in the internal market. Directive COM(2005)603. 
O
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These transactions can be routed through several payment systems: 
payment systems for interbanking transfers, payment systems for securities 
traded on financial markets, and retail payment systems (for cash, checks, 
card payments, credit transfers, direct debits etc.). All these payment 
systems, whether for retail or wholesale transactions, share a clearly defined 
set of rules 3, processes, and instruments that enable their members to 
exchange money. 
It is increasingly difficult to understand how financial systems work, 
because money exchange mechanisms now involve complex competitive 
interactions between payment institutions on the one hand, and payment 
systems on the other. In fact, private payment systems organised as 
networks compete to offer services to payment institutions, so as to ease 
and expand their money exchanges, while meeting the cautious constraints 
defined by Central Banks. It is now possible to claim that there is a real 
payment service industry because monetary authorities do not wholly control 
the competitive game anymore. This trend is likely to escalate in years to 
come, notably in Europe, where there is a project to liberalise payment 
services 4. This ongoing revolution in the organisation of the European 
financial system encourages us to think about the contributions of industrial 
organization to the field of payment economics. The literature on networks is 
a good starting point for understanding how payment systems are 
organised 5. Indeed, this literature analyses the way a payment system 
prices access to its infrastructure and usage of its services, in the presence 
of network externalities 6. However, we will see that the theory on two-sided 
markets provides us with new elements to explain the way retail payment 
systems work, because it formalises the existence of indirect network 
externalities between two distinct groups of users, consumers and 
merchants. The payment system acts as an intermediary, which facilitates 
the interactions between end-users, trying to get both sides of the market on 
board by choosing appropriate prices. 
                     
3 The rules specify which payment instruments are accepted by the system, the characteristics 
of acceptance points, risk management, the clearing mechanism and the proceeding of funds 
transfers. 
4 For further information about the directive proposal on a "New Legal Framework" for payment 
services, see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/payments/framework/index_en.htm 
5 DAVID (1985), KATZ & SHAPIRO (1985), FARRELL & SALONER (1985), et alii. 
6 The value of a payment system increases with the number of its users. Network economics 
also deal with a number of essential issues for payment systems, such as standard setting, 
compatibility among service providers, and the role of an installed base of network facilities. 
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The purpose of this article is to underline that some private retail payment 
systems fit in well with the theory of two-sided markets. Our analysis goes 
beyond payment card systems. Our aim is also to highlight the limits of this 
theory in its analysis of the payment industry, due to its failure to take into 
account some of its peculiarities. The paper begins by discussing the two 
hypotheses provided by ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) to characterise two-
sided markets, namely the presence of indirect network externalities and the 
impact of price structure on transaction volume. We show that, unlike 
wholesale payment systems, retail payment systems fit in well with the first 
hypothesis, because they act as intermediaries between two distinct groups 
of users, consumers on the one hand, and merchants on the other. We 
subsequently draw a distinction between closed-loop and open-loop 
payment systems, which is necessary to discuss the second hypothesis. 
This typology enables us to show that two-sided market theory contributes to 
a better understanding of the asymmetric prices chosen by payment 
platforms. Meanwhile, we point out that it is less obvious to define direct 
debit and credit transfer systems as two-sided markets. This is followed by a 
discussion of the results provided by previous research on platform 
competition. We show that it is difficult to apply these results to competition 
between payment systems because the models do not take platform 
differentiation sufficiently into account. Finally, we try to propose some 
research perspectives. Indeed, the theory of two-sided markets could be 
developed to account for specific features from the payment industry. 
  Contributions of two-sided market theory  
to retail payment systems economics 
Why does two-sided market theory contribute to a better understanding 
of retail payment systems? Do all retail payment systems meet the criteria 
used to define two-sided markets? In this section, we discuss the two 
hypotheses provided by ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) to characterise two-
sided markets. Then we try to identify the retail payment systems that fit in 
with these assumptions. 
Definition chosen for two-sided markets 
The two-sided markets theory starts from the following observation: in 
many markets, a platform intervenes to facilitate the interactions between 
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two distinct groups of users (say group B for buyers and S for sellers) 7. This 
platform chooses its prices (denoted Ba  and Sa  respectively) so as to attract 
the two groups of agents in the market, and in order to internalise the 
indirect network externalities that each group causes to the other. Indeed, 
the number of agents from a given group willing to trade on the platform 
depends on the number of agents on the other side of the market. The 
presence of indirect network externalities between two distinct groups of 
users builds a first criterion to define two-sided markets.  
However, ROCHET & TIROLE (2004) consider that the first criterion is 
not sufficient to conclude that a market is two-sided. They suggest a more 
precise definition, whereby the transaction volume depends not only on the 
total price BS aa + , but also on the price structure ( Ba , Sa ). For instance, the 
transaction volume should be sensitive to a small reduction in the price paid 
by one group of users, if the aggregate price level remains constant. 
According to Rochet and Tirole, the failure of the Coase theorem is the key 
feature that links transaction volume to price structure. In other words, end-
users should not be able to pass interaction costs on from one side to the 
other, and bargain to internalise indirect network externalities. This situation 
may arise when transaction costs are high or when the platform sets up 
rules that prevent end-users from bargaining 8. 
Indirect network externalities in retail payment systems 
The rising number of transactions carried out using paper money 
accelerated the development of private retail payment systems. We show 
that these systems meet the first criterion used to define two-sided markets. 
The specificity of retail payment systems is to deal with a great number of 
creditors and debtors for small or average transaction volumes. Retail 
payment platforms act as intermediaries between two distinct groups of 
users, consumers on the one hand and merchants on the other. By contrast, 
wholesale payment systems only work with financial institutions, which can 
be seen as a homogenous group of users.  
                     
7 We assume that sellers and buyers are homogenous. 
8 We will see for instance that a payment platform can forbid surcharges. A merchant is said to 
surcharge when he charges a higher retail price to a consumer using a specific payment 
instrument. 
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The development of retail payment systems is closely related to the 
existence of indirect network externalities in retail banking markets. For 
instance, in joining a payment platform, consumers take into account the 
number of merchants accepting the payment instruments marketed by the 
system. Conversely, the merchants' benefits from membership will increase 
with the number of consumers holding the payment instruments of the 
system. As a result, demands from consumers and merchants are heavily 
inter-dependent. That is why new retail payment systems often face what is 
referred to as, "the chicken-and-egg problem". These payment systems 
must use appropriate prices to attract both groups of users in the market, 
and to balance demands. This creation of incentives for two distinct groups 
of users is not an issue for wholesale payment systems, because the latter 
only involve relatively homogenous financial institutions 9. Thus, retail 
payment systems meet a specific logic, which seems to correspond to the 
first criterion used to define two-sided markets. 
Typology of retail payment systems 
There are two types of retail payment systems: closed-loop and open-
loop systems. At this point in our analysis, it is important to understand this 
typology, because the results presented by economic literature on platform 
pricing are heavily influenced by the type of system considered. 
In a closed-loop system 10, the platform is managed by a single 
company, which signs all contracts directly with cardholders and merchants. 
Amex, Diners Club, and private label cards like the "Pass" card issued by 
the French retailer Carrefour are often referred to as closed-loop retail 
payment systems. Amex issues cards that can only be accepted by 
merchants affiliated with its platform and charges both consumers and 
retailers directly. The system used by Carrefour for its "Pass" card is very 
similar, except that its acceptance network is limited to Carrefour stores. 
Those systems are not necessarily specific to payment cards: for example, 
the issuance of gift checks accepted by a group of shops corresponds to a 
three party system 11. 
                     
9 Two banks can play different roles during the settlement of a transaction, but these roles may 
be switched during the following deal. 
10 Also referred to as "three-party" systems. 
11 In many countries, gift checks are not legally considered as payment instruments. 
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The organisation of open-loop payment systems is more complex, for its 
members act as intermediaries between the platform and its end-users, 
consumers and merchants. Two levels of pricing must be taken into account: 
the pricing of the services provided by the platform to banks, and the pricing 
of services provided by banks to end-users. In this case, the impact of the 
prices chosen by the platform on end-users depends on the degree of 
competition between banks 12. The Visa and MasterCard payment card 
systems are examples of open-loop systems. Banks pay fees to become 
members, but remain free to choose their pricing policy as regards 
cardholders and merchants. 
















                     
12 For instance, if retail-banking markets are perfectly competitive, banks' costs are completely 
passed on to consumers and merchants. 
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Examples of indirect network externalities in retail payment systems 
In this section, we show that card and check payment systems meet the 
first criterion used to define two-sided markets. However, it less obvious to 
define indirect usage network externalities between end-users for distant 
payment systems, such as direct debit and credit transfer systems. 
ROCHET & TIROLE (2002) first used card payment systems to illustrate 
the two-sided markets theory. Indeed, these payment systems exhibit 
indirect network membership and usage externalities. To build a card 
payment system, banks have to sign up merchants to acquire cards, and to 
provide incentives for cardholders to use them. The launching of the 
payment card "Carte Bleue" in France aptly illustrates the issue of 
membership externalities. To overcome merchants' resistance to card 
acceptance, the French banks decided to provide them with new services, 
such as payment guarantee and partnerships with international networks like 
BankAmericard and BarclayCard in 1973 13. 
The existence of network externalities in the payment card industry was 
first underlined by Baxter in 1983, a long time before the emergence of 
literature on two-sided markets. 
 Benefit from a transaction Price of a transaction 
Consumer, Bank I, 
"issuer" 
Bb  Ic  
Merchant, Bank A, 
"Acquirer" (*) 
Sb  Ac  
(*) In a closed-loop system, I and A are identical. 
Baxter noticed that each user will be willing to proceed to a transaction if, 
and only if, the benefit of that transaction exceeds its price, which is equal to 
the bank's marginal cost under perfect competition. Baxter assumes that the 
merchant cannot discriminate according to the payment instrument 14. 
Therefore, a consumer will be able to use his payment card if at the same 
                     
13 For more details about the launching of the payment card in France, see: "La carte bleue: la 
petite carte qui change la vie", Patricia Kapferer and Tristan Gaston-Breton, édition le cherche 
midi. The payment garantee was a good way of competing with cheques, which were not 
garanteed. 
14 Otherwise, there is no externality associated to card usage, because the merchant can 
always charge a higher price for this instrument. This rule is called "Non Discrimination Rule" 
(NDR). 
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time I
B cb ≥  and AS cb ≥ . Consequently, socially optimal transactions 15 
are sometimes refused either by the consumer if I
B cb < , or by the merchant 
if A
S cb <  16. 
Economic literature has provided an in-depth analysis of payment card 
networks, which is discussed in greater detail below. However, let us first 
examine if there are other retail payment systems that also share this first 
characteristic of two-sided markets. Cheque payment systems also entail 
externalities of the same kind as payment card systems. There are retailers 
who do not accept cheques at all, or set an upper limit (often at EUR 15 in 
France) for cheque payments 17, resulting in a negative externality for the 
consumer. The issue is not similar for cash payments, because this 
instrument of payment is universal. There is no acceptance network for 
cash, which proves that this system does not meet the criteria used to define 
two-sided markets. The existence of usage externalities is also less obvious 
for distant payment systems, such as direct debit and credit transfer 
systems. Indeed, when a consumer transfers funds on a merchant's 
account, s/he transmits a payment order to his bank that cannot be refused 
by the merchant 18. Furthermore, credit transfer and direct debit systems do 
not need to be supported by specific investments and equipment from 
banks' clients. Consequently, those systems do not need to provide 
incentives for end-users to participate in these platforms 19. 
                     
15 Socially optimal transactions verify IA
BS ccbb +≥+ . 
16 Several factors can account for this negative externality. Merchants' resistance to card 
acceptance can be high, or there may be an imbalance between issuers' and acquirers' costs, 
generating a higher price on one side of the market 
17 Cheque payments are not guaranteed in France for payments exceeding EUR 15. 
18 This analysis is based on the French direct debit and credit transfer systems. Systems in 
Germany are very different.  For further information, please refer to the study conducted by 
Bogaert&Vandemeulebrooke at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/payments/directdebit/index_en.htm. 
At the same time, one could argue that there are indirect membership externalities between 
banks in these payment systems 
19 This does not mean that both banks in direct debit and credit transfer systems offer the same 
services for the settlement of a transaction. 
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Relation between pricing and transaction volume  
in retail payment systems 
This section of the paper tries to identify the conditions under which card 
and cheque payment systems meet the second criterion used to define two-
sided markets. How does the pricing chosen by the platform affect the 
volume of transactions processed via the platform? We distinguish between 
closed-loop and open-loop payment systems, and assume that merchants 
cannot charge consumers different prices according to the type of payment 
instrument used. 
Case of closed-loop payment systems 
Closed-loop systems using a linear tariff fall perfectly into line with the 
theoretical framework built by ROCHET & TIROLE (2003b) to analyse 
platform pricing. To begin with, they assume that a monopoly platform 
chooses its prices Ba  and Sa  for buyers and sellers, respectively, to 
maximise its profits. They show that two conditions must be satisfied to 
achieve an optimal outcome: 






where c represents the platform's marginal cost and h the sum of merchants' 
and consumers' demand elasticities. 
The price structure must reflect the ratio of the elasticity of consumers' 





ηη =  
20.  
In reality, the price structures of payment systems are often skewed 
towards one side of the market 21. For example, EVANS (2003) shows that 
the credit card system Diners Club developed thanks to the asymmetric 
prices it charged consumers and merchants: two years after its creation in 
                     
20 If the platform chooses its prices to maximise the social surplus, the price structure also 
reflects the difference between the average surplus generated on each side of the market (see 
Rochet and Tirole 2003 for further information). 
21 In reality, payment card platforms also charge fixed membership fees, but this does not 
modify the results obtained by Rochet and Tirole substantially. The platform uses per-interaction 
prices 
Bp and Sp which take into account usage pricing and fixed costs, which are incurred 
on a transaction by transaction basis. 
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1949 Diners Club was deriving over three quarters of its revenues from 
merchants. Initially, credit cards were even given away to consumers to 
encourage them to participate in the system and solve the chicken-and-egg 
problem. At the same time, merchants were ready to pay more for 
membership to attract buyers they perceived as valuable. This asymmetric 
pricing is not specific to card payment systems. Gift vouchers, for example, 
are often given away to consumers, while merchants must pay a 
commission to the platform on acceptance 22. These examples show that 
two-sided market theory provides us with a strong framework for explaining 
asymmetric pricing on payment platforms. 
Case of open-loop systems 
As far as open-loop systems are concerned, the issue is more complex, 
because two levels of prices must be taken into account: the prices that 
banks are charged by the platform, and the prices that end-users are 
charged by banks. The impact of platform pricing on end-users will depend 
on the kind of competition between payment institution members of the 
system. Economic literature on this subject provides an in-depth analysis of 
open-loop payment card systems managed by payment card 
associations 23. These systems use a specific mechanism of commissions to 
charge platform usage, referred to as "interchange fees" 24.  
Prices of payment card systems and interchange fees 
The literature on payment card systems assumes that the platform 
chooses a special tariff: the merchant's bank, A, (A for "Acquirer") pays to 
the consumer's bank, I, (I for "Issuer") a price per interaction "a", which is 
called the "interchange fee". In that case, using the notations we introduced 
previously, we have: aaa BS =−= . If the interchange fee is positive, the 
cardholder's bank is subsidised each time the card is used. Consequently, if 
this subsidy is partially passed on to the cardholder, who pays a lower price 
p per transaction, it serves to boost consumer demand. In compensation, the 
acquirer (A) can totally or partially pass on its cost "a" to the commissions 
                     
22 This information is confirmed by the French company Kadeos. 
23 Payment card systems are not the only example of open-loop payment systems. One can 
cite, for instance, the system of cheque exchange and storage managed by the American 
company Viewpointe. Literature on this topic analyses a lot of payment card systems because 
of the popularity of this payment instrument. 
24 Interchange fees have been subject to many controversies, which are not discussed in this 
article. 
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"m" paid by merchants. This linear pricing studied in literature on the topic is 
a good representation of a system like Visa. Indeed, the merchant's bank 
pays the consumer's bank a fixed percentage per transaction, which 
corresponds exactly to interchange fees as defined by literature on this 
subject. However, other systems have chosen to implement more complex 
pricing methods. The French payment card system "CB", for example, chose 
to use a two-part tariff, which involves a fixed multilateral part, and a variable 
bilateral part 25. This example suggests that the theoretical results shown by 
the literature rely heavily on the modelling choice. Indeed, in all articles, the 
interchange fee is modelled using a linear and multilateral tariff. In reality, 
the definition of interchange fees varies a lot across countries and payment 
card systems. The reader will find useful information in the comparative 
analysis carried out by WEINER & WRIGHT (2005). 
Interchange fees and externalities 
Baxter's basic model shows that an appropriate choice of interchange fee 
enables the platform to internalise the fundamental externality described 
above. Let us look once again at the benefits and costs of an interaction for 
each user. 
 Benefit from a transaction Cost of a transaction 
Consumer Bb  acI −  
Merchant Sb  acA +  
Assume that the platform chooses an interchange fee A
S cba −=  26. In 
this case, social optimality is restored, because each agent agrees to 
proceed with a socially optimal transaction. Consequently, when there is 
perfect competition, the platform pricing perfectly internalises a negative 
externality, if any, caused by the consumer to the merchant.  
Literature on interchange fees 
Baxter's analysis of interchange fees opened up a new branch for 
economic literature on payment card systems and several authors extended 
                     
25 The variable part will vary across the couples I-A. The first element of the variable part 
depends on the transaction volume, and the second on another bilateral part, which is 
calculated according to the relative number of cards from each bank used fraudulently. 
26 The interchange fee in this model is either positive or negative. The hypothesis of a positive 
interchange fee is equivalent to the assumption of a negative usage externality caused by the 
consumer to the merchant. 
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their work to cover this issue 27. In fact, this literature mainly considers two 
questions. Firstly, under what conditions does the interchange fee chosen by 
the platform impact the transaction volume generated by end-users? 
Secondly, if the interchange fee is not neutral, is the interchange fee chosen 
by the platform socially optimal? The reader can refer to ROCHET's review 
of the literature for further details (2003), and to WEINER & WRIGHT (2005) 
for a cross-country analysis. 
  Modelling competition between payment systems: 
perspective from two-sided markets theory 
The two-sided markets theory offers a good start to model platform 
competition, which sheds light on the way payment systems interact 
strategically. This section shows that payment platforms can compete either 
to attract new consumers or to affiliate new merchants. Afterwards, when 
several payment platforms are available, platforms compete for usage. The 
intensity of competition for membership depends on whether users can 
belong to several platforms. We then discuss the findings of research on the 
usage prices chosen by competing payment platforms. This section will 
essentially follow the literature and focus on payment cards. 
Competition between payment systems: access and usage 
There are two kinds of competition between payment platforms: 
competition for access or membership and competition for usage. Access 
competition characterises the fact that payment systems seek to encourage 
as many users as possible to become members of the platform. For closed-
loop payment systems, like Amex, it simply consists of getting a large 
number of consumers and merchants on board. For open-loop systems, as 
usual, the mechanism is more complex, because there are two levels of 
players. The system must provide incentives for banks to participate and 
become members. Afterwards, the latter compete in banking retail markets 
to offer payment services to consumers and merchants. 
                     
27 ROCHET & TIROLE, SCHMALANSEE, WRIGHT, GANS & KING… they model different 
sorts of competition between banks, between merchants on retail markets, consider 
heterogeneous consumers, differentiated merchants etc. 
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This difference between closed-loop and open-loop systems is extremely 
important to an understanding of the way payment systems compete to 
provide payment services on the one hand and the way banks compete in 
retail markets on the other, as members of the same payment association. 
Platform usage is necessarily impacted by the fact that an open-loop system 
does not directly charge its end-users. Indeed, banks will not necessarily 
provide incentives for consumers to buy the payment instruments specifically 
accepted by the system and to use them at the point of sale. Most of the 
time, banks multihome, which means that they offer consumers a bundle of 
payment instruments, which can be issued by competing systems. For 
instance, for a given transaction, a bank may offer its clients the possibility of 
using the cheque payment system, the Visa card payment system, or other 
competing systems. Multihoming can offer a competitive edge, because 
consumers will choose the bank that provides them with the most 
comprehensive bundle of payment instruments at the best price. To some 
extent, banks can sometimes encourage the use of a payment instrument at 
the point of sale, by providing consumers with bonus points or rebates.  
This shows that the issue of multihoming and singlehoming is essential to 
understanding payment platform competition. If consumers hold several 
payment instruments at the point of sale, for instance, systems cannot 
charge merchants with excessive commissions, otherwise the latter would 
not choose to be affiliated with the platform. Merchants need not be affiliated 
with several platforms, because they know that consumers can substitute 
one payment instrument for another. In order to compete with Amex for 
merchants' acceptance, for instance, Visa chose to charge merchants lower 
fees. This strategy was supported by an advertising campaign claiming that 
Visa was "everywhere you want to be", whereas some merchants do not 
accept Amex. This enabled Visa to overtake Amex in the credit card market, 
despite the fact that the Visa brand appeared 18 years later 28. Conversely, 
if payment systems know that merchants need to accept as many payment 
instruments as possible to be valuable for consumers, they will tend to 
compete on the other side of the market by opting for lower fees for 
consumers. The cost allocation is then skewed towards merchants. 
                     
28 Amex started issuing cards in 1958. 
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Competition for usage 29  
ROCHET & TIROLE obtain the first results about the prices charged by 
two competing closed-loop platforms. In a first step, they assume that buyers 
and sellers are affiliated with two proprietary platforms, and that they can 
use one platform or both. They also consider that merchants are not 
strategic, and that consumers end up choosing the platform on which the 
transaction will be processed, when sellers are ready to deal on both 
platforms. This assumption is perfectly realistic for most payment systems 
because the consumer chooses the instrument used at the point of sale, 
provided the merchant leaves him the choice. However, it is perhaps not 
empirically true to assume that merchants always accept all cards. For 
instance, in 1991, Boston restaurant owners started to decline American 
Express cards in their establishments in a highly public campaign against 
Amex's high merchant commissions. The incident became known as "The 
Boston Fee Party." 
ROCHET & TIROLE show that platform competition results in prices very 
similar to those chosen by a monopoly platform. Indeed, the symmetric 









On the buyers' side, demand elasticity is replaced with B0η , the "own-
brand" elasticity (demand elasticity of buyers who choose platform i when 
the seller offers transactions on both platforms 30). On the sellers' side, 
demand elasticity is multiplied by the inverse of s, the singlehoming index. 
The s, which can also be seen as a loyalty index, measures the proportion of 
consumers that stop trading when their favourite platform is no longer 
available. In reality, is there a lot of multihoming for payment systems? 
Empirical results from Marc RYSMAN's work (2004) show that consumers 
often hold several payment cards, but tend to use one platform. Over 75% of 
                     
29 ARMSTRONG (2005) "competition in two-sided markets" analyses platform competition 
when heterogeneous agents differ across their fixed adoption benefit (In ROCHET & TIROLE, 
agents differ across their usage benefits). He suggests that his assumptions (lump sum pricing, 
fixed costs) intend to better reflect other two-sided markets than payment cards (nightclubs, 
shopping malls and newspapers). 
30 If 1=iσ  then own-brand elasticity is equal to demand elasticity. 
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the participants surveyed in his study spend over 87% on the same card in a 
month. However, some consumers switch to another platform periodically. 
Marc Rysman computes a transition matrix, which provides a good 
estimation of the loyalty index 31. The indices computed are relatively high 
(from 73.1% for Amex to 85.4% for Visa) 32.  
How are Rochet and Tirole's results modified if competition takes place 
between open-loop platforms? The latter assume constant margins for 
banks competing in retail markets, denoted by Bm  and Sm  respectively, with 
BS mmm +=  33. The prices charged by competing platforms at a symmetric 
equilibrium are characterised by the following equations: 





ηση =0  
Even if competition in retail markets is intense (m=0), platform 
competition does not result in a socially optimal price structure, as the 
equation above fails to acccount for end-user surpluses. 
GUTHRIE & WRIGHT (2003) extend ROCHET & TIROLE's models 
(2002 and 2003b) 34. If consumers hold only one payment card, platforms 
compete to attract this group of users. Consequently, they wish to distort the 
price structure to favour them, which can only take place through a rise in 
the interchange fee subsidising the issuer. However, if merchants are 
homogenous in terms of costs and acceptance benefits, platform 
competition does not modify the prices chosen by a monopoly platform. 
Indeed, the latter already chooses the maximal level of interchange fee 
compatible with card acceptance. On the contrary, if all merchants are 
heterogeneous, platform competition causes an increase in interchange 
fees, and at the same time of commissions paid by merchants. This situation 
                     
31 For example, if a consumer mostly used the Visa network in a given month, what would be 
the probability that the Visa network would be his/her favourite network again the following 
month? 
32 ARMSTRONG & WRIGHT analyse the role of exclusive contracts that prevent multihoming 
in platform competition. 
33 According to this hypothesis, maximisation of profits and volumes are equivalent for the 
platform. 
34 They consider strategic merchants with no surcharges and perfect competition between 
identical platforms. Like ROCHET & TIROLE (2002 and 2003), they also assume constant 
margins for banks on each group of users. 
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has been observed in reality: platform competition can paradoxically trigger 
a rise in the prices paid by a group of users 35. Indeed, a study conducted by 
Kenneth Posner and Athina Meehan from Morgan Stanley research 
department 36 shows that Visa and MasterCard raised their interchange fees 
to face competition with Amex. 
If consumers hold two payment cards, platforms compete on the 
merchant side to encourage the latter to accept their card, or even to favour 
it over the second card held by the consumer. In such cases, platform 
competition decreases interchange fees, which may even become lower 
than the socially optimal fees. This situation is less frequently observed in 
reality, because merchants are not allowed to temporarily refuse a payment 
card when they multihome. Sometimes they must even accept all cards 
offered by a given network, due to the "honour-all-cards rule" 37. 
Furthermore, as we saw previously in Rysman's study, consumers often 
express a strong preference for one card. 
CHAKRAVORTI & ROSON (2005) extend the literature in two directions. 
Firstly, they assume that platforms are differentiated and that the benefits of 
usage of each platform are different for consumers and merchants. 
Secondly, they take into account the impact of competition on the total price 
charged by the platform 38. However, they do not consider strategic 
merchants and assume that consumers use one card at most. The falling of 
the constant margin hypothesis modifies the results obtained first by Rochet 
and Tirole, then by Guthrie and Wright. Indeed, Chakravorti and Roson 
compare the prices chosen by a duopoly of two differentiated platforms and 
a cartel. They show that competition reduces the total price charged by the 
platform, which increases the welfare of consumers and merchants. 
However, the impact of the price reduction on each sub-market (consumer 
and merchant) is not uniform. Consequently, when banks' margins are not 
fixed, platform competition has a positive impact on welfare. If benefits are 
uniformly distributed, they determine the conditions whereby consumers 
stand to benefit more from the price decrease than merchants. 
                     
35 However, Guthrie and Wright's hypotheses do not offer a clear description of the situation 
observed in reality. 
36 Diversified financials. Industry Overview "Attacking the death star", April 15th, 2004. 
37 In practice, it is extremely difficult to verify whether merchants respect this rule for payments 
at the point of sale. 
38 Banks' margins are not fixed. As we saw previously, maximisation of profits and volumes are 
not equivalent for the platform. 
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  Research perspectives and changes needed  
to better understand retail payment systems 
The limits of the "two-sided" markets approach 
The lack of empirical evidence quantifying indirect network externalities  
in payment systems 
The first natural criticism of the two-sided market theory pertains to the 
lack of empirical research to quantify indirect network externalities between 
consumers and merchants. In order to estimate membership and usage 
externalities in payment card systems, for instance, one should first use data 
to estimate demand on both sides of the market. This would be difficult to 
achieve, since most merchants are already equipped with terminals to 
accept cards in the majority of developed countries. When they are affiliated 
with a system, merchants are generally not allowed to turn down cards 
because of the "honour-all-cards" rule. It would consequently be impossible 
to estimate the negative usage externality that merchants would be likely to 
cause to consumers. It would also be rather difficult to derive a demand 
function for cards on the consumer side, because prices vary significantly 
from bank to bank, according to the bundle of services sold with the card. 
The appropriate theoretical framework from the literature on two-sided 
markets should consquently be chosen to estimate the links between 
transaction volumes and price structure. This would also prove difficult to 
estimate for the payment card industry, since consumers usually pay yearly 
or quarterly membership fees, while merchants are charged per transaction. 
Compared to other two-sided markets, like the media industry, it seems 
more difficult to gather the appropriate data and develop a theoretical 
framework to analyse the payment card industry 39.  
The lack of specific elements from payments industry 
As far as theory is concerned, the models developed by literature on two-
sided markets do not take into account key aspects from the payment 
industry such as risk management or fraud prevention. Payment systems 
                     
39 Readers interested in empirical analysis of other two-sided markets can refer to KAISER & 
WRIGHT (2006) for the media industry and RYSMAN (2004) for the business directory market. 
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often choose more complex pricing methods to provide incentives for their 
members to invest in security or in fraud detection programs, as already 
mentioned for the French Carte Bleue system. For the moment, the quality 
of payment services (which can depend on different elements such as 
security or payments guarantee) is absent from the analysis of payment 
systems. However, current evolutions in the European legal framework 
(NLF) should encourage economists to analyse other aspects of payment 
systems, such as the impact of risk management on access and usage 
pricing. Let us consider another example. If a payment system gives access 
to two different types of users, a mobile network operator that is a simple 
"payment institution" and a credit institution, which pricing method should it 
implement? Both players are subject to different regulatory constraints in the 
New Legal Framework. However, an incident caused by an erroneous risk 
management strategy could eventually affect all members of the system in 
the same way. It would also be interesting to take the quality and risk 
management issues in to account when studying platform competition. The 
following subsection provides some research perspectives for competition 
between payment platforms. 
The limits of platform competition models for the payment industry 
It is worth noting that there are some limits to the current approach 
towards competition between platform systems. Firstly, payment system 
differentiation is not sufficiently taken into account. Moreover, the models 
used in the literature do not help us to understand competition between 
closed-loop and open-loop systems. Finally, evolutions observed in the 
industry encourage us to study other issues, and enable us to provide some 
research perspectives. 
The issue of payment system differentiation 
It seems difficult to use the results obtained by Rochet and Tirole or 
Guthrie and Wright to compare the prices chosen by Amex and Diners, or 
Visa and MasterCard. Indeed, payment systems generally offer 
differentiated services for the settlement of a transaction: payment 
guarantee, transaction security, clearing method etc.. Even the Visa and 
MasterCard networks, which seem very similar, try to differentiate 
themselves through innovation and technologies. Consequently, system 
competition is unlikely to generate a symmetric equilibrium, as is often the 
case in the literature. Moreover, differentiation of payment services could be 
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useful to model the entry of newcomers in the payment industry. This issue 
is all the more important, since new players, like retailers or mobile network 
operators, have shown their willingness to participate to the payment 
industry, and to offer alternative payment technologies. Under what 
conditions will these newcomers compete with existing payment systems? 
Will competition between payment systems involve some infrastructure 
sharing, differentiation or complementarity of payment services? 
CHAKRAVORTI & ROSON (2005) already started to analyse the impact 
of payment system differentiation on platform competition. It would be 
interesting to develop their study to find analytical results 40. Meanwhile, it 
seems very important to lift the constant margin hypothesis to analyse 
platform competition 41. Are the results obtained by Chakravorti and Roson 
sensitive to the assumption of uniform distributions of benefits for consumers 
and merchants? It would also be interesting to see how these conclusions 
may evolve with strategic merchants. This would confirm whether Guthrie 
and Wright's results are related to this specific hypothesis and enable us to 
compare both models. At the same time, it may be useful to study platform 
system differentiation through the prism of unbundling. Will payment 
systems benefit from the unbundling of essential functions, such as clearing, 
to better differentiate themselves from other services? When the transaction 
chain is unbundled, how do payment systems manage their complem-
entarity? What is the impact of unbundling on the risks born by each 
payment systems? 
Competition between closed-loop and open-loop systems 
The literature on two-sided markets does not often model competition 
between closed-loop and open-loop systems 42. In the panel data used by 
Mark Rysman, 12% of the consumers that prefer to use the Discover 
network one month will switch to Visa the following month. This proves that 
there is also a kind of competition between closed-loop and open-loop 
systems. From a bank's point of view, it would be interesting to analyse the 
incentives to participate in an open-loop system, rather than building its own 
                     
40 CHAKRAVORTI & ROSON only give numerical simulations for the results of competition 
between differentiated platforms. 
41 These authors work on the hypothesis that banks' margins are constant. Consequently, as 
we saw previously, maximisation of volume and profits for the platform are identical. 
42 To our knowledge, the only paper on this subject was written by MANENTI & SOMMA 
(2002). 
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proprietary network. This issue seems all the more important nowadays 
since open-loop systems are increasingly subject to regulatory pressure, 
forcing them to decrease their interchange fees. Is it possible for open-loop 
systems to decrease their interchange fees while facing competition from 
closed-loop systems? And is it socially optimal to set up an asymmetric 
regulation of interchange fees as the Australian regulator has done? 
New research perspectives inspired by the single European payments area 
The creation of a single European payments area and the future of the 
various national payments systems open interesting research perspectives. 
For instance, the literature on two-sided markets does not offer answers to 
incentives that could encourage two payments systems to merge. In fact, the 
single European payments area will certainly encourage national systems to 
seek economies of scale. Mergers between payment systems are not the 
only scenario to consider. One could also imagine that the national systems 
would cooperate so as to accept payment instruments issued by other 
platforms. National payment systems can also decide to use common 
supports for payment instruments that can be used in several different 
systems. For instance, the cards issued in the French system CB are 
cobranded with the Visa or the MasterCard logo, which means that they are 
accepted by these networks, when the French use them abroad. Under what 
conditions and rules will the payment systems be able to use common 
instruments 43? What is the impact of cobranding alliances on competition? 
  Conclusion 
The literature on two-sided markets sheds light on the way some retail 
payment systems work and interact. The essential contribution of this branch 
of literature is to show that asymmetric user pricing is needed to optimise the 
volume of transactions that are routed through the platform. Consumers and 
merchants are charged prices by payment systems that do not reflect the 
cost of serving them. Nevertheless, we show that the two-sided market 
approach does not enable us to cover all the features of the payments 
                     
43 It would be interesting to examine if the example provided by SCHIFF (2003) , whereby 
open-loop systems offer shared access to one side of the market, could be applied to payment 
systems. 
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industry. Moreover, while card payments have been widely analysed, we still 
lack results on other payment instruments such as cheques. Furthermore, 
risk management and fraud prevention deserve more attention. One way of 
tackling those issues may be to consider the quality of the service provided 
by the platform. Finally, the literature on platform competitionhas not yet 
dealt with the issue of cooperation or mergers between payment systems. 
Our view is that a better understanding of retail payment systems is 
needed to ensure an appropriate regulation of these markets. For instance, 
we do not yet know which definitive rules will be adopted in the European 
directive to define European payment instruments. However, we think that 
the contributions of the two-sided market theory should not be neglected. 
For example, payment cards and direct debits do not obey the same logic 
and should not be dealt with in the same way. We also believe that fraud 
prevention is a key issue, which should inform reflections on the various 
statuses that the Commission intends to define for payment service 
providers. 
Moreover, the emergence of new payment instruments and technological 
evolutions, such as contactless payments, will perhaps provide us with some 
data to empirically test the hypotheses of two-sided market theory. 
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